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Abstract
Face anti-spoofing plays a crucial role in protecting face
recognition systems from various attacks. Previous model-
based and deep learning approaches achieve satisfactory
performance for 2D face spoofs, but remain limited for more
advanced 3D attacks such as vivid masks. In this paper,
we address 3D face anti-spoofing via the proposed Hyper-
graph Convolutional Neural Networks (HGCNN). Firstly,
we construct a computation-efficient and posture-invariant
face representation with only a few key points on hyper-
graphs. The hypergraph representation is then fed into the
designed HGCNN with hypergraph convolution for feature
extraction, while the depth auxiliary is also exploited for
3D mask anti-spoofing. Further, we build a 3D face attack
database with color, depth and infrared light information to
overcome the deficiency of 3D face anti-spoofing data. Ex-
periments show that our method achieves the state-of-the-
art performance over widely used 3D and 2D databases as
well as the proposed one under various tests.
1. Introduction
Face recognition has been widely applied to a variety of
areas, including access control systems, online payment and
user authentication. Nevertheless, vulnerability exists in a
large amount of systems that they sometimes fail to recog-
nize fake faces, which may be used by attackers to hack the
systems. This is also referred to as face spoofing, an at-
tempt to deceive recognition systems with photos, videos or
masks. In this paper, we aim to address the following types
of attacks, with emphasis on 3D masks:
Print Attack-2D: An attacker uses a photo printed or
displayed on the screen to deceive the camera. This attack
only employs one fixed image.
Replay Attack-2D: This attack is more tricky with a pe-
riod of video played repeatedly in front of the camera. Hu-
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Figure 1. Illustration of the proposed HGCNN architecture for 3D
face anti-spoofing, which takes RGB and depth images as the input
and generates classification scores as the output. We first construct
a hypergraph over augmented landmarks of each face on both the
RGB and depth images. Then we perform the designed hyper-
graph convolution on both modalities for feature extraction, which
leads to the final spoofing scores. Our model is posture-invariant
and computation-efficient due to the robustness and compactness
of the proposed hypergraph representation. (Best viewed in color)
man behavior is more natural compared to print attacks.
Mask Attack-3D: In this type of attacks, a mask is uti-
lized to conceal the original face. The success of attacks de-
pends on the quality of masks. The state-of-the-art masks1
are so vivid that sometimes even human may be unable to
discriminate real faces.
Various methods have been proposed to address these
attacks, i.e., face anti-spoofing. Previous model-based ap-
proaches [29, 10, 11, 45, 23, 35, 6, 31] make use of RGB
images or sequences as the input and feed hand-crafted fea-
1For example, ThatsMyFace.com makes unique personalized lifesize
wearable masks with one’s likeness from photos.
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tures such as LBP features into classifiers, which lacks 3D
information. With the development of deep learning, Con-
volutional Neural Network (CNN) becomes a powerful tool
for feature extraction, and is thus leveraged for face anti-
spoofing [16, 25, 34, 27]. Several approaches have achieved
promising performance via CNN and other techniques such
as optical flow analysis [3]. Depth is a kind of remark-
able cue for recognizing 2D attacks such as print and replay
attacks. Atoum et al. propose to estimate the depth of a
face image via a fully convolutional network, which is then
utilized for anti-spoofing [2]. Instead of depth estimation,
Wang et al. capture depth maps from Kinect for classifi-
cation along with 2D facial images [42]. However, both
methods leverage depth for detecting 2D attacks, while 3D
mask attacks remain to be addressed.
Hence, we propose Hypergraph Convolution Neural Net-
works (HGCNN) with RGB-D information to detect both
2D attacks (print/replay) and 3D mask attacks. Firstly, we
propose compact face representation by only key points,
including landmarks and a few interpolated points, which
leads to remarkable reduction of both time and space com-
plexity while retaining most facial information. Because
the key points are likely to reside on irregular grids, we fur-
ther represent them on a hypergraph, which models high-
order relationship of samples via hyperedges, each of which
links multiple samples. As the relationship among samples
on a hypergraph is invariant to postures, i.e., the relation-
ship remains the same no matter how one moves the face,
hypergraph-based facial representation is more robust to
face motions or emotions compared with traditional image
representation. This is because the hypergraph describes
the relative relationship instead of the absolute Euclidean
distance among samples.
Thereafter, we take the hypergraph representation of
faces as the input, and design a framework of HGCNN
based on hypergraph convolution. Essentially this is an ex-
tension to the recently proposed Graph Convolutional Neu-
ral Network (GCNN) [8, 13, 22, 12], which takes both data
features and connectivity/topology2 of graph signals as the
input and extracts higher-level features via graph convolu-
tion, either in spectral domain or in nodal domain. However,
the input graphs in the current GCNNs are simple graphs,
where an edge connects just two samples for modeling the
pairwise relationship. Also, simple graphs are sensitive
to the radius parameter used in the similarity calculation.
Hence, we extend the input simple graphs to hypergraphs,
which address both problems by modeling higher-order re-
lationship among samples via hyperedges. The subsequent
graph convolution, is thus also extended to hypergraph con-
volution for higher-order feature extraction. Further, we ex-
2The connectivity/topology of graph signals is often represented by an
adjacency matrix or a graph Laplacian matrix. The definitions of the ma-
trices in spectral graph theory will be introduced in Section 3.
ploit the depth auxiliary for 3D mask anti-spoofing, where
depth maps share the same hypergraph representation as the
RGB cue and then go through hypergraph convolution for
feature learning. The extracted depth features are then con-
catenated with the textural features to form the final node
features for classification.
Also, we build a 3D face attack database containing
color, depth and Infrared ray (IR) data acquired from In-
tel RealSense SR3003, which embodies more subjects and
variations than prior 3D face databases. Extensive experi-
ments show our method has superior performance and ro-
bustness on existing widely used 2D/3D databases and the
proposed one.
In summary, our contributions mainly include:
• We propose hypergraph-based face representation with
only a few key points, which is computation-efficient
and posture-invariant. Based on the hypergraph repre-
sentation, we design HGCNN with hypergraph convo-
lution for feature extraction.
• We exploit both RGB and depth information for 3D
mask anti-spoofing. The depth auxiliary is fused with
texture in the feature domain from hypergraph convo-
lution.
• We collect a 3D face attack database of rich and diverse
information, and achieve state-of-the-art performance
on widely used 2D/3D databases and the proposed one.
2. Related Work
2.1. Face anti-spoofing
Previous face anti-spoofing methods can be classified
into spatial methods, temporal methods and fusion meth-
ods.
Spatial methods. Texture is a good hint for discriminat-
ing between real faces and fake ones, since print or replay
attacks exhibit different textural characteristics from real
faces. Li et al. is the first to take frequency distribution into
consideration [24]. Other hand-crafted features are intro-
duced to tackle face anti-spoofing, such as LBP [24, 9, 15],
HoG [23] and DoG [40]. After extracting high-level fea-
tures, they adopt classifiers for final results, among which
SVM is a typical one [9]. Moreover, Galbally et al. exploit
the ability of image quality from the background and face
to improve the results [17].
With the rapid development of deep learning, CNN-
based anti-spoofing methods have been proposed to extract
features. Most of them regard the problem as simple binary
classification and extract features from texture images by
traditional networks such as VGG or ResNet [25, 34]. Fur-
thermore, [2] adopts depth as auxiliary information, divides
3https://realsense.intel.com/
images into different patches and feeds depth and color cues
into the network.
Temporal methods. Several methods explore the poten-
tial of liveness detection from temporal sequences, includ-
ing head movements and facial expressions. Pan et al. pro-
pose a straight-forward method that utilizes eye-blinking to
detect whether the facial motion is authentic[33]. Besides,
optical flow is introduced to analyze tiny expressions, which
is essential to extract rigid movements of masks [3]. Ed-
munds et al. extract low-level motion features such as eye
gazing and head pose from video clips to integrate high-
level features [14]. Xu et al. [44] propose an LSTM + CNN
framework to get fusion features for anti-spoofing.
Fusion methods. Leveraging on existing methods,
some approaches combine texture and temporal cues, which
achieve significant performance. Asim et al. propose a
CNN-based spatial-temporal feature extraction framework
for classification[1]. In [2], Atoum et al. propose a multi-
cue integration framework, including image quality, opti-
cal flow map and LBP features, followed by a neural net-
work classifying integrated features. Furthermore, Liu et
al. exploit Remote photoplethysmography (rPPG), a kind
of signal reflecting facial liveness, and propose a neural net-
work combining CNN and RNN to generate rPPG signals
for liveness detection[27].
2.2. Graph Convolutional Neural Networks
GCNN extends CNN by consuming data defined on ir-
regular grids. The key challenge is to define convolution
over graphs, which is difficult due to the unordered data.
According to the definitions of graph convolution, GCNN
can be classified into spectral-domain methods and nodal-
domain method.
Spectral-domain methods. The convolution over
graphs is elegantly defined in the spectral domain, which
is the multiplication of the spectral-domain representation
of signals. Specifically, the spectral representation is in the
graph Fourier transform (GFT) [19] domain, where each
signal is projected onto the eigenvectors of the graph Lapla-
cian matrix [19, 20]. The computation complexity, however,
is high due to the eigen-decomposition of the graph Lapla-
cian matrix in order to get the eigenvector matrix. Hence,
it is improved by [12] through fast localized convolutions,
where the Chebyshev expansion is deployed to approximate
GFT. Besides, Susnjara et al. introduce the Lancoz method
for approximation [39]. Spectral GCNN has shown its ef-
ficiency in various applications such as segmentation and
classification [22, 41].
Nodal-domain methods. Many techniques are intro-
duced to implement graph convolution directly on each
node and its neighbors. Gori et al. introduce recurrent neu-
ral networks that operate on graphs in [18]. Duvenaud et
al. propose a convolution-like propagation to accumulate
local features [13]. Bruna et al. deploy the multi-scale clus-
tering of graphs in convolution to implement multi-scale
representation [8]. Furthermore, Niepert et al. define con-
volution on a sequence of nodes and perform normaliza-
tion afterwards [32]. Wang et al. propose edge convolution
on graphs by incorporating local neighborhood information
[43], which is applied to point cloud segmentation and clas-
sification. Nodal-domain methods provide strong localized
filters, which however also means it is difficult to learn the
global structure.
3. Preliminaries
A hypergraph G = {V, E ,W} consists of a vertex set
V , a hyperedge set E where each hyperedge ei is assigned
a weight w(ei), and a diagonal matrix of the hyperedge
weights W. Further, G can be represented by a |V| × |E|
matrix H, with entries h(v, e) = 1 if v ∈ e and 0 otherwise,
which is referred to as the incidence matrix of G. Based on
H, the degree of each vertex v ∈ V is
d(v) =
∑
e∈E
w(e)H(v, e), (1)
whereas the degree of each hyperedge e ∈ E is
δ(e) =
∑
v∈V
H(v, e). (2)
For k-uniform hypergraphs considered in our context, the
degrees of all the hyperedges are the same, i.e., δ(ei) =
k, ∀ei ∈ E . We then let Dv and De denote the diagonal
matrices containing the vertex and hyperedge degrees, re-
spectively.
Several definitions of the hypergraph Laplacian have
been proposed, including clique expansion [49], star ex-
pansion [49], Bolla’s Laplacian [4], Rodriquez’s Laplacian
[36, 37] and normalized Laplacian [47]. It has been an-
alyzed in [48] that these formulations are similar to each
other. In the context of graph convolutional neural net-
works, we employ the normalized Laplacian in [46] because
of its normalization property, which is defined as
L = I−D− 12v HWD−1e HTD−
1
2
v . (3)
4. Approach
We first overview the architecture of the proposed
HGCNN. Then we dive into our method from the crucial hy-
pergraph representation to the subsequent hypergraph con-
volution and feature learning.
4.1. HGCNN Architecture
Fig. 2 illustrates the pipeline of the proposed frame-
work. The input consists of RGB and depth images. Firstly,
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Figure 2. The framework of our proposed HGCNN given a pair of RGB and depth images for 3D face anti-spoofing.
we construct a hypergraph on the input, in which we ex-
tract landmarks from the RGB image and then augment
the extracted landmarks for the purpose of denser point
sets, which conduces to learning local features, as demon-
strated in detail in Fig. 3. We then construct a k-uniform
hypergraph over the landmarks according to Euclidean dis-
tance of point pairs, from which we compute the hypergraph
Laplacian. Secondly, we feed the RGB and depth features
of the landmarks into separate branches of hypergraph con-
volution, along with the computed hypergraph Laplaican
for learning high-level textural and depth features respec-
tively. Finally, we concatenate the extracted features and
use Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) to acquire the output
classification scores.
4.2. Hypergraph Representation
Unlike existing methods, our network takes graphs rather
than images as the input, which means the hypergraph struc-
ture is the key to the subsequent neural network. In graph-
based image representation, a pixel is often treated as a
vertex in the graph, and similar pixels are connected via
edges. Due to the enormous amount of pixels in an image,
it is extremely time-consuming to take every pixel as the in-
put. Instead, inspired by facial landmark detection [21], we
propose an efficient approach for hypergraph construction
based on limited number of facial landmarks, as illustrated
in Fig. 2.
Landmark detection and augmentation. There are
plenty of methods for face landmark extraction. In order
to extract landmarks rapidly and robustly, we apply [21] to
the input RGB image and obtain 68 landmarks. If the land-
marks are out of box or not detected, the current frame is
neglected. Since the number of landmarks is not enough
for feature extraction from neural networks, point augmen-
tation is necessary. We thus propose to augment points by
interpolation of the detected landmarks.
We firstly calculate k-nearest-neighbors of each land-
mark, and add the midpoint of each neighboring pair to the
point set as augmentation. The distance metric between a
pair of points {i, j} is defined as the Euclidean distance,
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Figure 3. Landmark-based hypergraph construction from a given
RGB image.
i.e., ai,j = ‖pi − pj‖22, where pi and pi are the coor-
dinates of point i and j respectively. As some midpoints
might be overlapping, we eliminate redundant points, re-
sulting in 250 interpolated points. Together with the origi-
nal landmarks, we finally extract a total of 318 points with
RGB and depth cues to represent each face for the subse-
quent processing. Note that, as the detected landmarks re-
side on irregular grids in general, all the extracted points are
also irregular, which is difficult to represent via traditional
signal representation.
Hypergraph Construction. In order to describe the
high-order relationship of the extracted irregular landmarks,
we propose to construct a hypergraph over each face.
Specifically, we treat the extracted points as vertices on
the hypergraph, and connect each point with its k-nearest-
neighbors using an hyperedge, which leads to a (k + 1)-
uniform hypergraph. The weight for each hyperedge is as-
signed 1, as we assume all the hyperedges are of equal im-
portance.
4.3. Hypergraph Convolution
The core of HGCNN is hypergraph convolution, which
is an extension to graph convolution. Graph convolution has
received much attention recently, and many network models
have been proposed to tackle graph-based problems [22].
Unlike images or videos, it is difficult to define convolu-
tion over graphs/hypergraphs in the vertex domain, because
a meaningful translation operator in the vertex domain is
nontrivial to define due to the unordered vertices. Inspired
by [12], we start from filtering of hypergraph signals in the
spectral domain, and then deploy Chebyshev approximation
to reduce the computational complexity.
Spectral filtering of hypergraph signals. The convolu-
tion operator on a graph ∗G is first defined in the spectral do-
main [8], specifically in the GFT domain. GFT is computed
from the graph Laplacian matrix. As the graph Laplacian is
symmetric and positive semi-definite, it admits a complete
set of orthonormal eigenvectors. The GFT basis U is then
the eigenvector set of the Laplacian matrix. The GFT of a
graph signal x is thus defined as xˆ = UTx, and the inverse
GFT follows as x′ = Uxˆ. As an extension to hypergraphs,
the normalized hypergraph Laplacian L defined in Eq. 3 is
also symmetric and positive semi-definite. Thus, we extend
GFT to Hypergraph Fourier Transform (HGFT), with the
eigenvectors U˜ of the normalized hypergraph Laplacian L
as the basis.
Hence, the convolution between two hypergraph sig-
nals x and y can be defined as the multiplication of the
corresponding HGFT coefficients, followed by the inverse
HGFT, i.e.,
x ∗G y = U˜(U˜Tx) (U˜Ty), (4)
where  is the element-wise Hadamard product. Then the
spectral filtering of a graph signal x by gθ is
y = gθ(L)x = gθ(U˜ΛU˜T )x = U˜gθ(Λ)U˜Tx, (5)
where Λ is a diagonal matrix of the eigenvalues of L.
Chebyshev approximation for fast filtering. The spec-
tral filtering, however, has high computational complexity
of O(n3) due to the eigen-decomposition of the Laplacian.
Inspired by the truncated Chebyshev polynomials for the
approximation of the spectral filtering [12], we approximate
the aforementioned hypergraph convolution by K-hop lo-
calized Chebyshev polynomial filtering:
y = gθ(L)x ≈
K−1∑
k=0
θkTk(L)x, (6)
where θk denotes the k-th Chebyshev coefficient. Tk(L)
is the Chebyshev polynomial of order k. It is recurrently
calculated by Tk(L) = 2LTk−1(L) − Tk−2(L), where
T0(L) = 1, T1(L) = L. The computational complexity
is then reduced to O(K|E|). Practically, we set K to 1 in
order to reduce complexity.
4.4. Feature learning
Inspired by CNN, we apply the fully-connected layer
with ReLU activation function to previous features and ex-
tract high-dimensional features, which is formulated as fol-
lows.
y = ReLU(gθ(L)xW + b), (7)
where W ∈ RF1×F2 is a matrix of learnable weight pa-
rameters, and F1 and F2 are the dimensions of generated
features in two connected layers respectively. b ∈ Rn×F2
is the bias.
In particular, as illustrated in Fig. 5, color and depth
channels are fed into two similar branches without weight
sharing, each composed of two hypergraph convolution lay-
ers of (64, 128) hidden nodes. Limited by the database
scale, we only add two layers to avoid over-fitting. After
that, we concatenate features from different layers as the fi-
nal output of hypergraph convolution. The bypass connec-
tion enlarges the receptive field of the network. Finally, the
output features are sent to the average pooling layer, which
are pooled into a 768-dimension vector. The final score is
calculated by three fully-connected layers with ReLU acti-
vation function, which are composed of (256, 64, 2) hidden
nodes. We choose the cross-entropy cost function as the
object function to minimize.
5. Dataset Details
In order to overcome the deficiency of 3D face data,
we collect a 3D face anti-spoofing database, referred to
as FA3D, with color, depth and IR information. Apart
from rich facial information, there exhibits high variation in
our database like translation, expression and rotation. The
dataset will be made public soon.
The database contains 285 videos of 19 subjects
recorded by Intel RealSense SR300. The videos include
RGB videos of resolution 1920 × 1080, the corresponding
aligned depth videos and IR videos of the same resolution4.
For each subject, we collect five sections, each correspond-
ing to a different posture, as demonstrated in Fig. 4. In
section 1, the subject blinks several times; in section 2 the
subject moves horizontally and vertically; in section 3 the
subject moves back and forth; and in section 4 people are
asked to make expressions such as smile. In section 5 the
subject yaws within -15◦ to 15◦. The attacks include all the
aforementioned categories we aim to address: print attacks,
replay attacks and 3D mask attacks. Print attacks are based
on high-resolution photos printed by Canon LBP7100, and
the videos are recorded under the same settings as real ones
except that we skip the rotation part. Replay attacks orig-
inate from real video clips, replayed by Macbook Pro un-
der the same environment. For mask attacks, we employ
a unique 3D latex mask and let different people wear the
mask and record videos. To summarize, the attacks con-
sist of 3-subject print attacks, 5-subject replay attacks and
4-subject mask attacks. Besides, the database contains real
samples of 7 subjects.
4The resolution of the captured depth and IR videos is 640×480, which
are then processed by the SDK of RealSense to reach the same resolution
as RGB videos.
Blink Translation Move back Expression Rotation Replay Print
Figure 4. Sample frames of different sessions in the proposed FA3D dataset.
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Figure 5. The details of the proposed HGCNN structure.
6. Experiments
We first perform detailed ablation study to examine the
contributions of the proposed model components to the face
anti-spoofing performance. Then we compare our results
on 3D datasets and 2D datasets with other state-of-the-art
approaches for comprehensive evaluation, as well as cross
test. Finally, we provide some visualization and analysis of
our model.
6.1. Experimental Setup
Databases We evaluate the proposed framework on
multiple attack databases for generalizability, including
3DMAD [15], the proposed FA3D and Oulu-NPU [7].
3DMAD is the only existing publicly available 3D spoof-
ing database, containing 17 subjects and 255 video clips
with 3D masks from Thatsmyface.com. Each video is
recorded by Kinect with resolution 640 × 480. The large-
scale Oulu-NPU database consists of 5940 real and attack
videos recorded with six types of smartphones under three
different illumination conditions. The attack types are print
and video-replay, using two printers and two display de-
vices. The number of subjects is 55, which are divided into
subject-disjoint training, development and testing. 3DMAD
and our proposed FA3D are primary databases on which we
conduct experiments with our 3D model. Besides, we test
on the 2D dataset Oulu-NPU in order to compare with tra-
ditional 2D anti-spoofing methods for comprehensive stud-
ies. For each database, we follow the training-validation-
test protocol as described.
Model details The detail of our framework is depicted
in Fig. 5. For each database, we prepare landmarks and hy-
pergraphs before feeding into the network. The input then
consists of 318 points with RGB and depth channels as well
as the constructed hypergraph Laplacian. Specially, batch
normalization is added before the activation function. Dur-
ing the training process, we set the learning rate according
to the database, ranging from 10−3 to 10−4. Adam opti-
mizer and Xavier initializer are utilized with batch size of
50.
Evaluation metrics Many metrics have been proposed
to evaluate the performance of face anti-spoofing. In our
experiments, we deploy the following commonly used met-
rics [23]: Accuracy (ACC), Half Total Error Rate (HTER),
Equal Error Rate (EER), Attack Presentation Classification
Error Rate (APCER), Bona Fide Presentation Classifica-
tion Error Rate (BPCER), Average Classification Error Rate
(ACER), False Discovery Rate (FDR), True Discovery Rate
(TDR) and Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC).
6.2. Experiment Results
6.2.1 Ablation Study
In order to research advantages of different modules of the
proposed HGCNN comprehensively, we design the follow-
ing incomplete models. Model 1 is the model without hy-
Table 1. Ablation study results from different models on 3DMAD
TDR
FDR 1% 5% 10% 20%
Model 1 54.8% 58.4% 69.9% 88.4%
Model 2 75.7% 80.5% 84.6% 93.3%
Model 3 86.3% 93.6% 97.8% 98.2%
Model 4 97.8% 100% 100% 100%
Table 2. Intra-test results of different methods on 3DMAD
Method HTER
Siddiqui et al. (HOOF) [38] 2.35%
Chingovska et al. (LBP + SVM) [9] 0.95%
Feng et al. (OFM) [16] 4%
Edmunds et al. (Motion) [14] 3.53%
Liu et al. (rPPG) [26] 4.22%
Menotti et al. (CNN) [30] 0.70%
HGCNN 0%
pergraphs, which is equivalent to the original model except
the number of vertices in each hyperedge k = 0. Model
2 is our model with the depth channel removed, i.e., only
the RGB cue is taken as the input. In Model 3, we replace
the hypergraph representation with simple complete graphs,
where the weight of each edge is assigned as the exponen-
tial function of the Euclidean distance between the two con-
nected vertices i and j, i.e., wi,j = exp{−‖ci−cj‖22}, with
ci and cj denoting the coordinates of i and j respectively.
The hypergraph Laplacian is then replaced with the simple
graph Laplacian accordingly as used in [22]. Model 4 is the
proposed complete model.
We test these models on the 3DMAD database and fol-
low the protocol in [15]. More specifically, since the docu-
mentation doesn’t define the index of validation, we follow
the leave-one-out-cross-validation (LOOCV) settings and
calculate the average value. The results are reported in Tab.
1, where we calculate TDR at different FDR, the higher the
better. From the results we observe that Model 1 has the
worst performance, which means the hypergraph represen-
tation and convolution plays a vital role in our model. The
degradation of performance in Model 2 is less significant
but still large without depth, thus indicating the importance
of incorporating the depth cue. When hypergraphs are re-
placed with simple graphs as in Model 3, the performance
is better but not as good as Model 4, which validates that the
hypergraph representation is superior to simple graph repre-
sentation for describing higher-order relationships. Model 4
achieves the best performance of 100% in TDR when FDR
is beyond 5%.
6.2.2 Results on 3D datasets
3DMAD We conduct intra-test on 3DMAD evaluated by
HTER, with results reported in Tab. 2. We follow the test
Table 3. Comparison with 2D methods on FA3D
Method APCER BPCER ACER ACC
LBP+SVM [15] 10.1% 65.4% 38.1% 66.5%
FASNet [28] 0.7% 9.2% 4.5% 97.6%
HGCNN 0.1% 1.6% 0.7% 99.6%
protocol in [15], i.e., selecting 8 subjects for training, 5 for
validation, and 5 for test. From the results we observe that
our model achieves the state-of-the-art performance com-
pared with model-driven [38, 9, 16, 14, 26] and CNN-based
methods [30]. The model-driven methods exploit motion
(optical flow map (OFM), rPPG), texture (LBP) or multi-
cue integration (HOOF), while the CNN-based one deploys
the VGG-16 model and fine-tuning.
FA3D In order to evaluate more comprehensive perfor-
mance on our dataset, we design different protocols for test.
Protocol 1 is designed to test the generality in terms of un-
seen subjects, which means subjects appearing in the train-
ing data are absent in the test process and vice versa. Specif-
ically, we randomly select 10 subjects as training data and 7
subjects for test. In protocol 2, we test the robustness to dif-
ferent postures. We extract one posture from each subject in
the training stage, and use the other postures for test. In pro-
tocol 3, we exemplify the efficiency of depth data by split-
ting attack types. Mask attacks are utilized during training,
while print and replay attacks are used for test. The results
are reported in Tab. 4. We can see that the accuracy is high
for all the protocols. In particular, with the depth auxiliary
our model only misclassifies 46 out of 12000 true frames,
i.e., resulting in BPCER of 0.4%.
Furthermore, in order to compare our method with CNN-
based methods on 3D datasets, we implement the state-of-
the-art CNN-based method FASNet [28] and texture-based
method LBP+SVM [9] with RGB-only input, and conduct
experiments on FA3D of protocol 1. As reported in Tab. 3,
our method achieves the best performance on any metric.
Also, note that BPCER is higher compared with APCER,
which is due to the data skew—fake samples are 4 times
more than real ones, i.e., it is aimed to minimize false ac-
ceptance rate.
6.2.3 Cross Test on 3DMAD and FA3D
Generalizability is a primary problem in real situations.
Since the illumination and depth variance is quite differ-
ent, cross test is much more challenging than intra-test. we
test the generality across different situations on 3DMAD
and FA3D datasets, after filtering replay and print attacks in
FA3D so that only mask attacks remain in both datasets.
The results are reported in Tab. 5. We achieve 34.0%
in HTER on FA3D-3DMAD, while the inverse one only
achieves 49% in HTER. This is probably due to the little
variance in the 3DMAD dataset, in which the illumination
and postures are almost identical.
Table 4. Our intra-test results with different protocols on FA3D
Protocol Variation HTER APCER BPCER ACER ACC
1 Subjects 0.5% 0.1% 1.6% 0.7% 99.6%
2 Posture 0.6% 0.0% 1.8% 0.9% 99.3%
3 Attack Types 0.3% 0.0% 0.4% 0.2% 99.9%
Table 5. Cross-test results on FA3D and 3DMAD.
Train-Test FA3D-3DMAD 3DMAD-FA3D
HTER 34.0% 48.1%
EER 43.0% 49.2%
AUC 62.5% 51.5%
6.2.4 Results on 2D datasets
To make comparison with traditional 2D-based methods,
we further test our model on the widely used RGB-only
dataset Oulu-NPU with Protocol 1. Note that, our method
is able to achieve accuracy of 100% with the depth aux-
iliary on 2D attacks by examining whether the input im-
age/video has face-like depth. For fair comparison, we re-
move the module of depth convolution in our model, i.e.,
only the RGB cue is leveraged in our method in this com-
parison. We compare with Baseline [5], MixedFASNet [28]
and GRADIANT extra [5], and list the results in Tab. 6.
We see that HGCNN (RGB-only) achieves competitive per-
formance with the state-of-the-art methods, with GRADI-
ANT extra reaching even lower ACER. This is because this
method fuses color, texture and motion information as well
as exploiting both HSV and YCbCr color spaces, whereas
our RGB-only HGCNN only exploits the RGB cue in a
static image without temporal information.
As HSV aligns with human vision perception better, we
further exploit HSV and RGB color spaces together, thus
resulting in 6-channel images as the input. Also, we in-
crease the degree of all the hyperedges so as to mine the
textural features globally. This is referred to as HGCNN
(RGB+HSV) in Tab. 6, which outperforms all other meth-
ods. This further demonstrates the ability of extracting tex-
ture features based on color cues. Some false accepted
samples are presented in Fig. 6, due to the deficiency of
subtle feature extraction. For example, the replay attack in
Fig. 6(b) is of low resolution, but such image quality feature
is not fully exploited due to sparse landmarks.
6.2.5 Visualization and Analysis
To interpret the graph structure more vividly, we visualize
the latent feature space of different layers in Fig. 7, where
darker colors represent smaller distance. We observe that
point features in the input are not quite distinguished from
each other, but after hypergraph convolution points tend to
(a) Print (b) Replay (c) Real
Figure 6. Examples of failure anti-spoofing on Oulu-NPU.
Table 6. Results from different methods on Oulu-NPU.
Methods APCER BPCER ACER
MixedFASNet [28] 0.0% 17.5% 8.8%
GRADIANT extra [5] 7.1% 5.8% 6.5%
Baseline [5] 5.0% 20.8% 12.9%
HGCNN (RGB) 6.5% 10.1% 8.3%
HGCNN (RGB+HSV) 6.0% 6.8% 6.4%
(a) Layer 0 (Input) (b) Layer 1 (c) Layer 2
Figure 7. Euclidean distance among 68 landmarks. Darker colors
denote smaller distance.
keep similar features with adjacent ones, especially in cer-
tain regions like the mouth, nose and eyes. At Layer 2,
points within same facial features resemble to each other,
which is reflected in Fig. 7 that the color of certain regions
is very dark, such as 0-17 (the edge of left face) and 48-68
(the edge of mouth).
7. Conclusion
We propose hypergraph-based convolutional neural
networks for 3D face anti-spoofing, which provides
computation-efficient and posture-invariant face representa-
tion and enables learning of high-order relationship among
samples via hypergraph convolution. Also, we exploit fu-
sion of RGB and depth cues by performing the same hyper-
graph convolution on them, and identify the importance of
the depth auxiliary for 3D face anti-spoofing. Besides, we
collect a 3D face attack database that contains more subjects
and variations than prior 3D face attack databases. Exten-
sive experiments demonstrate the superiority of our method.
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